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BULLETIN



DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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12 FEBRUARY 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR rejects US proposal for treaty on limited nuclear test ban.

USSR proposes to build three dams in Iraq.

II, ASIA-AFRICA


Indonesian Army will oppose any attempt by President Sukarno to appoint Communists to cabinet.


Indian press implies Khrushchev's prestige in India will be lowered if he fails to influence Peiping to moderate its stand on border issue.

Israelis to continue to send ships to Port Said with cargoes from Israel in effort to obtain UAR agreement to permit use of canal under Hammarskjold formula.


III, THE WEST

Bolivian Government expects armed conflict between elements of government party before opening of party convention on 15 February; could spark widespread conflagration.





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



12 February 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I: THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*Nuclear Test Talks: Soviet delegate Tsarapkin's immediate rejection of the new American proposal for a limited treaty reflects Moscow's intention to maintain its insistence on a ban on all tests, apparently on the assumption that further concessions can be extracted from the United States by exploiting Britain's disposition for a compromise arrangement. The USSR now may seek to drive a wedge between the Western delegations by calling for a moratorium of fixed duration on underground tests below the US-proposed threshold and by agreeing to a joint research program to perfect methods of detecting underground tests. Any Soviet counterproposal along these lines probably would be made conditional on US acceptance of Khrushchev's scheme for an annual quota of on-site inspections of suspected nuclear explosions—a concept first advanced a year ago by Prime Minister Macmillan.

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USSR-Iraq: An increase in Soviet economic activity in Iraq, including an expansion of the credit program, may be under way. The chief of the Soviet Hydro-Engineering Design Institute in Moscow has stated that the USSR proposes to build a 330-foot-high dam on the Tigris River and two smaller dams on the Euphrates River, surveys for which have already been completed. The Soviet-Iraqi \$137,500,000 economic aid agreement of early 1959 covered only planning and research for these projects.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

	Indonesia: General Nasution, Indonesia's army chief of staff and defense minister, has informed anti-Communist	25X1
	political leaders that the army will oppose any attempt by	
	President Sukarno to appoint Communists to the cabinet, which	
	he reportedly wishes to do. Colonel Sukendro, deputy army chief of staff for special affairs, appeared deeply concerned	
	over Sukarno-Nasution relations during an interview with the	
	US army attaché on 9 February. Sukendro stated that appar-	
	ently Sukarno feels Nasution is becoming "too mighty" and	
	that he has no alternative except to use the Communist party	
	to balance army power. Sukendro had previously given the	25X1
. *	impression that differences between the two officials were not serious.	
	serious.	
	Khrushchev Visit to India: The Indian press has prepared	
	the Indian public to expect from Khrushchev during his five-day	
	visit some significant effort to improve Sino-Indian relations.	
10.	At the same time, a number of influential papers express skep-	
U	ticism of Khrushchev's ability to influence Peiping, thus suggesting that his prestige in India may be lowered if he fails to	
	moderate Peiping's stand on the Sino-Indian border issue.	25X1
	Israel - Suez Canal: An Israeli Foreign Ministry official	5V4
	has stated that ships with cargoes from Israel will continue as 2 a "matter of principle" to appear at Port Said 'from time to	5X1
	time" in attempts to use the Suez Canal under the formula the	
61	UAR previously had privately agreed upon with UN Secretary	
,)	General Hammarskjold. The Israelis presumably expect to	
70	benefit diplomatically by keeping the UAR embroiled in the canal controversy.	٠.
25X1	concroversy.	
5X1	III. THE WEST	
	Bolivia: The Bolivian Government is expecting armed con-	
	flict to erupt between elements of the right and left wings of the	
	government party before the opening of the party convention on	
	12 Feb 60 DAILY BRIEF ii	
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15 February. The right as it apparently controls	only 15 percent of	the convention de	1-
egates and may want to d	isrupt the meeting	The American	Em-\
bassy in La Paz reports almost any incident could	tnat, in view of na d spark a serious	conflagration.	
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(Available du	ring the preceding	week)	
Probable Developme	ents in Japan Over	Next Five Years.	**
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12 Feb 60	DAILY BRIEF	iii	


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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Israel to Make New Attempts to Send Cargoes Through Suez Canal



12 Feb 60

III. THE WEST

Serious New Violence May Break Out in Bolivia

The American Embassy in La Paz warns that almost any incident could spark a serious conflagration in Bolivia, particularly in the mining and agricultural regions, where armed violence occurred in late January.

One imminent source of conflict is preparations for the nominating convention of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) scheduled for 15 February. The MNR nomination is tantamount to election. There already have been clashes between supporters of Victor Paz Estenssoro and Walter Guevara, left- and right-wing presidential candidates. A group supporting Paz is in armed control of one well-to-do residential section, and the government is expecting serious conflict between the armed civilian militia of the two factions. The right wing may use force to disrupt or postpone the convention, since Guevara appears to have only 15 percent of the delegates.

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If the convention opens as scheduled, the principal controversy is likely to center on the vice-presidential nomination. Leftist labor leader Juan Lechin appears to be the leading candidate. Paz is heavily indebted to Lechin for his own convention strength but would probably prefer a more conservative candidate.

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12 Feb 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 2

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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The Director of Intelligence and Research

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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